Political compulsions cannot override military requirements. A sensible government won’t give in to unfair demands, regardless of consequences. The Yahapalana government betrayed the war-winning armed forces when it co-sponsored a US-led accountability resolution in early Oct. 2015. Over the years, governments blundered when dealing with those spearheading the separatist project. President Ranasinghe Premadasa foolishly vacated strategically important camps during the 1989-1990 period thinking that it would help to win over the Tigers. The vacated camps included Point Pedro and Valvettiturai. Premadasa granted presidential pardon for convicted LTTE terrorists. Also in line with his overall flawed strategy, Premadasa facilitated the setting up of the political wing of the LTTE and funded the group to the time of Rs 125 mn during 1989-1990 period. Some of the funding was made available after the LTTE resumed hostilities in June 1990, following 14-month long honeymoon with the UNP leader.

Finally, he himself paid the supreme price for such follies when a Tiger suicide bomber, who had infiltrated his inner circle, carried out one of the most daring suicide attacks during the May Day celebrations of 1993 in Colombo.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

SLPP National List MP Namal Rajapaksa, on Nov. 20, expressed serious concerns over the planned vacation of an Army camp in the Jaffna peninsula. War-winning President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s eldest son and former Minister tweeted: “According to reports, an Army camp in the North has been withdrawn, for land to be released back to civilians, and many more such camps are to be withdrawn in the coming months. While the release of lands is not an issue, if it is done in consultation with the security forces, it should not be done at the cost of compromising national security. SL fought 30 years to defeat terrorism and today all communities enjoy freedom at the cost of thousands of lost lives. It is of utmost importance that national security is maintained, whether it is in the North or South.”

Contrary to his declaration, the strategically located detachment, a company headquarters of a Sinha Regiment battalion, hadn’t been vacated yet. A highly placed defence official told the writer, last weekend, that the military negotiated with landowners regarding the handing over of the camp. Negotiations that had been initiated during the tail end of Ranil Wickremesinghe’s presidency were finalized and the pullout would be completed in two weeks, the official said. Karkovalam is situated south of Point Pedro light house area.

Lawmaker Rajapaksa alluded the proposed removal of the camp to an understanding between President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s National People’s Power (NPP) government and the Northern community, plus the Tamil Diaspora that enabled his party to secure all electoral districts in the Northern and Eastern provinces, except Batticaloa. Both lawmaker Rajapaksa and the defence official were referring to troops based at Karkovalam, near the coast of Manalkadu in Vadamaratchchy (north). The Navy maintains a base at Point Pedro, north of Karkovalam. The emphasis should also be on neutralizing smuggling operations across the Palk Straits.

Jaffna peninsula consists of three sectors, namely Waligamam, Thennamaratchchy and Vadamarachchi.

In a story headlined ‘Sri Lankan army camp in Jaffna ordered to disband after decades of occupation’, posted on Nov, 20, The Tamil Guardian declared the vacated three acres of land would be returned to its rightful owners. The Tamil Guardian claimed that: “It is the first move to dismantle the intense militarization of the Tamil homeland in years.”

Obviously, there hadn’t been any order in respect of the Karkovalam pullout. The whole exercise had been conducted in an orderly manner, through negotiations between the military and the landowners.

The SLPPer’s tweet, pertaining to Karkovalam pullout, should be examined taking into account the criticism directed at the NPP government over the opening of the Palali-Achchuveli main road that remained closed for over 15 years, after the successful conclusion of the war. Newly elected President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who is also the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, in his capacity as the Defence Minister ordered the Palai-Achchuveli main road opened two weeks before the general election held on Nov. 14.

One cannot find fault with MP Rajapaksa for taking up the issue against the backdrop of the humiliating defeat suffered at the recently concluded general election. The only Rajapaksa in Parliament after the political tsunami brought the SLPP down to just three MPs (two elected and one appointed), the former Hambantota District lawmaker had no option but grab any opportunity to hog the limelight. Despite the humiliating performance at the two recent national polls, the SLPP won handsomely at the two preceding Presidential and General elections. Unfortunately, the SLPP took the massive mandates received on those occasions for granted.

The issue at hand is whether the NPP would pursue an agenda inimical to national security, as alleged by the SLPP and other interested parties. Did the opening of the Palali-Achchuveli main road, and the vacation of Karkovalam, undermined the overall security in the Jaffna peninsula?

The new government has been accused of bending backwards to appease the Northern community and the Tamil Diaspora. Interested parties took advantage of a congratulatory message issued by the influential Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC) on the NPP’s victory at the general election. The CTC dealt with six specific issues, including two that pertained to the deployment of the armed forces, and the security sector. Let me reproduce them verbatim:

(a) Restoration of Land Rights: The CTC called for the return of privately-owned lands in the Northern and Eastern provinces that are currently occupied by the military, as well as a cessation of illegal land acquisitions, to rebuild trust and restore rightful ownership.

(b) Reform of the Security Sector: The letter emphasized the need to align the military presence in the Northern and Eastern provinces with the rest of the country and to discontinue military involvement in commercial ventures, such as farming and hospitality, which hinder local businesses and farmers.

The presidential and general elections delivered a knockout blow to the Diaspora groups. The CTC is no exception. Actually, the CTC’s call to reduce the military presence in the Northern and Eastern areas is irrelevant. Such declarations are only meant to deceive the gullible public and appease those who cannot bear the LTTE’s defeat.

The war-winning Mahinda Rajapaksa government authorized the releasing of both state and privately-owned land in the Jaffna peninsula during Lt. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya’s tenure as the Commander of the Army (15 July 2009 – 31 July 2013).

Gradual releasing of land continued throughout the post-conflict period as successive governments thinned military presence in the Northern and Eastern regions. Therefore, the opening of the Palali-Achchuveli main road, and vacation of Karkovalam, shouldn’t be a cause for unnecessary concern but considered in line with the government overall security posture.

Perhaps, the best way to promote post-war national reconciliation is countering unsubstantiated war crimes allegations that were utilized by the US to move an accountability resolution, targeting Sri Lanka, in early Oct. 2015. The treacherous Yahapalana government co-sponsored that resolution, thereby betraying the war-winning military and the political leadership. Whatever the shortcomings on the part of the Rajapaksas and those aligned with them, they cannot be deprived of the nation’s gratitude for sustaining the war effort in the face of daunting challenges, both domestic and external.

Pre-2005 Jaffna

Those who complain of saturation of the Northern and Eastern regions with military and police conveniently forget whichever political party that had been in power was compelled to face the LTTE’s conventional military challenge, as well as meticulously planned operations, conducted in areas under government control, in order to sow chaos.

At the time Eelam War IV erupted in the second week of August 2006, the largest deployment of troops was in the Jaffna peninsula, that was brought under government control during the 1995-1996 period. Karkovalam area had been captured during that period.

In 2006, the LTTE had approximately 15,000 square kms under its control in the Northern and Eastern regions and the group posed quite a significant threat to the government. Their main concentration of troops and firepower had been aimed at preventing the Army from trying to push southwards across the Muhamalai defence line. Jaffna military bases had been within the range of the LTTE’s long range artillery. The group had considerable firepower that overwhelmed the Army on many occasions, particularly those battalions deployed along Kilali-Muhamalai-Nagarkovil frontline before they were brought down to their knees during the Aug. 2006-May 2009 all-out campaign to defeat the might of the separatist LTTE.

The LTTE almost succeeded in overwhelming Jaffna during the 2000-2001 period but the military managed to stabilize the peninsula before Eelam war IV erupted in August. There had been four Divisions, plus troops, deployed in the peninsula, and two of them, 53 and 55 Divisions, joined large scale operations on the Vanni east front in late 2008. The combined armed forces brought the war to a successful conclusion in May 2009 against the assertions of pundits here and abroad.

Having eradicated the LTTE within three years, the winding down of security forces deployment began in the absence of an LTTE threat. Although some foreign governments and sections of media asserted that the LTTE could resume hit and run attacks and engagements were likely to continue for years, such a situation didn’t materialize. That was primarily due to over 12,000 cadres, both hardcore and child soldiers, surrendering to the advancing Army. The LTTE simply lacked the will, or the wherewithal, to engage the Army in hit and run attacks.

Had the LTTE retained at least a minor post-war ‘operational’ capacity, the gradual reduction of troops from the North and East could never have taken place. The Tamil community and the Tamil Diaspora should appreciate the total destruction of the LTTE that enabled the gradual disassembling of what can be described as ‘security structure’ in place in the North with the ending of the needless bloodshed.

Regardless of the restoration of civil administration, the government cannot, under any circumstances, lower its guard. The deployment of armed forces must be the exclusive prerogative of the government of the day.

Gradual decrease in strength

Rapid recruitment during Eelam War IV resulted in almost doubling of the Army’s strength. By the time the combined security forces eradicated the LTTE menace in May 2009, the regular and volunteer strength of the Army alone had been 205,000 officers and men. Now, the strength is down to 8,600 officers (both regular and volunteer) and 130,000 other rankers (both regular and volunteer). Of course, in the absence of war, there is no need to maintain wartime recruitment levels but the government must ensure sufficient strength necessary to meet any eventuality. The current political leadership, under no circumstances, should absolve itself of the responsibility for maintaining adequate strength in the armed forces to ensure that we do not go back to having mere ceremonial three branches of the armed forces wholly inadequate to take on any threat to the sovereignty of the nation.

During Wickremesinghe’s presidency, that government suddenly declared that the Army would be reduced to 135,000 by the end of 2024 and 100,000 by 2030. Perhaps, the NPP government should disclose its position on the previous government declarations.

Regardless of the developing political-economic-social challenges against the backdrop of bankruptcy, it would be the responsibility of the military top brass to brief the political leadership of the ground situation. Post-war national security requirements shouldn’t be looked at only on the basis of economic indicators. That would be suicidal. In other words, the country is in such a precarious situation, the political leadership may tend to conveniently ignore basics, especially to please various interested parties, thereby jeopardizing national security.

Declaration that the SLA would be reduced to 100,000 by 2030 means the total strength would be cut by half, from its peak.

Over 15 years after the conclusion of the war, the Jaffna peninsula remains the top priority with quite considerable strength assigned to the Vanni theatre. The NPP handsomely won the Jaffna and Vanni electoral districts at the general election but peace secured at a tremendous cost cannot be undermined.

At the height of the war, the overall Jaffna deployment, including islands, surpassed 45,000. But, troop levels had been gradually brought down though three infantry Divisions (51, 52 and 55) are deployed therein. The Army raised the 51 and 52 Divisions during CBK’s presidency to carry out ‘Operation Riviresa’ that brought the Jaffna peninsula under government control by 1996. The Army engaged in ‘Operation Jayasikurui’ struggling on the Vanni front, raised the 55 Division in Dec. 1996.

In the Vanni theatre, there are five Divisions (54, 21, 56, 59 and 64) and one of them is expected to be moved out soon. It would be pertinent to mention that the Vanni deployment covered three administrative districts, namely Vavuniya, Mannar and Mullaitivu.

Commenting on the planned Karkovalam pullout, a senior retired officer asserted that it could be viewed as part of a broader initiative by President Dissanayake’s government to return lands occupied by the military. The NPP move represents a significant step toward reconciliation though it elicited mixed reactions, the emeritus Maj. General said. He asserted that the government shouldn’t make hasty decisions by releasing lands in quick succession. “Instead, a detailed assessment of both present and future security threats should be conducted. Decisions regarding the removal of military bases should be carefully evaluated, while ensuring a robust reserve force is maintained for national security.”

Another senior officer, who had served with the Special Forces, asserted that new thinking was necessary. Referring to experience in the Vadamaratchchi sector, the veteran said that the overall deployment strategy should be changed with several large bases in strategic locations with the ability to carry out rapid deployment in case of an emergency.

There should be consensus that the new government should decide on further reductions taking into consideration both private and state land released since 2010. There is no doubt that Defence Secretary, retired AVM Sampath Thuiyakontha, wartime Commanding Officer of Mi-24 helicopter gunship squadron, and Deputy Defence Minister, retired Maj. General Aruna Jayasekara, would look into the entire gamut of issues pertaining to vacation of bases.

Those demanding that the military deployment in the Northern and Eastern regions align with the rest of the country shouldn’t forget that civilians would have been still in camps for the displaced if not for Sri Lanka’s triumph over terrorism. CTC or some other Diaspora grouping cannot decide on Sri Lanka’s defence needs as an economically weakened country shouldn’t risk its security by weakening the military.

The forthcoming Local Government polls will help the government to ascertain the developing situation. Having increased its tally at the general election just within weeks after the presidential poll, the NPP should tread carefully possible scenarios that could crop up not only in the Northern and Eastern regions but other areas as well.

Perhaps, the government should disclose the total land area vacated since the end of war 15 years ago. The understanding is that closer to 80 percent of land that had been once occupied by the military has already been released by successive governments. Those eternally upset about military presence must be reminded that the armed forces and police are the main blood donor in the North. Regardless of caste issues that are still paramount in that community, thousands of Tamils over the years during the war and after received blood donated by the country’s servicemen whenever there were requirements without any issues.

CFA factor

The Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) entered into in February 2002 among other objectives was meant to cunningly reduce the military strength, particularly in the Northern region. The UNP-led UNF had no sense of responsibility, therefore agreement was reached on reduction of military strength, and the proposed subsequent abolition of high security zones in the Jaffna peninsula, sent shock waves through the armed forces.

If not for the forthright stand taken by the then Jaffna Security Forces Commander Maj. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, the government may have had given up high security zones. Had that happened, our fate could have been different and the LTTE probably could have overwhelmed the Divisions deployed in the Jaffna peninsula.

How can we forget that in the wake of the Elephant Pass debacle in April 2000, the then government pleaded with India to evacuate the armed forces and police deployed in the Jaffna peninsula? Had India stepped in, that could have resulted in the breaking up of the country. The loss would have been irreversible. India’s refusal compelled the Army to fight back as there was absolutely no alternative but to face the enemy. In spite of considerable losses, the Army managed to halt the LTTE advance on Jaffna and slowly turn back the tide. They held on to new frontline at Muhamalai. Less than six years later, the Army transformed into a lethal fighting force that conducted offensive operations over a period of two years and 10 months until elusive Prabhakaran was killed on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon.