Continuing Mrs. Bandaranaike’s first term as PM

(Excerpted from Rendering Unto Caesar, by Bradman Weerakoon)

Although her political aspiration was “to lighten the burden on the suffering masses” Sirimavo soon found that the economic realities would not allow her a free hand. In the early sixties the terms of trade, which had been favourable in the fifties, declined sharply. The Korean war boom had run its course. The rise in the price of tea had plateaued and the trend was now downwards. Our external assets were diminishing and when Felix became finance minister he had no alternative but to cut down on imports drastically.

Use of the scarce foreign exchange resource was controlled and foreign travel, education and medical treatment abroad were strictly limited. Tariffs were increased on a large number of items other than food, fertilizer and medicines and the import of private motor cars was totally banned. As the situation worsened textiles, motor car and bicycle tyres and even common household items like batteries for torches and blades for shaving were hard to come by. I found that a welcome gift for a friend, when you had a chance of going abroad, was to bring him back a packet of Wilkinson blades.

Sirimavo had also to face the rising costs of the social-welfare measures which could not be reduced, except at great political risk, and which ensured a reasonable level of nutrition, health and education to the mass of the people. This cushioning of the cost of living by the rice subsidy, free health services and free education was becoming harder to maintain with each passing year. Something had to give and Felix preparing for the 1963 July budget, proposed to the Cabinet a reduction in the rice ration per family. He had of course got Sirimavo’s nod for the proposal but it was opposed by the Government Parliamentary Group and led to Felix’s resignation a few days before budget day.

T B Ilangaratne, a Bandaranaike old-timer well to the left of the party, was hurriedly sworn in as finance minister and there was no cut in the ration when the speech was read out. Once again, as in Dudley’s time, rice and its price had become a potent political instrument. Felix was given the ministry of agriculture but not without a delay of about two months, when he would often sit at my desk in the Temple Trees office wondering when and which portfolio Sirimavo would give him this time.

Ethnic Politics

The Federal Party, which had voted to defeat Dudley’s minority UNP government at the vote on the ‘Throne speech in March 1960 gave its support to Sirimavo Bandaranaike and the SLFP in the July elections. In return the Federal Party expected some movement on the proposals made in the BC Pact which had been further elaborated in its Statement of Minimum Demands which had been put both to the UNP and the SLFP.

These referred to the four basic objectives of regional autonomy for the Northern and Eastern Provinces, suspension of state-aided colonization, Tamil language rights especially regarding entry of Tamil speaking persons to government service and amendments to the Citizenship Act of 1948 which had deprived thousands of up-country Tamils of their right to vote.

However, Sirimavo’s immediate priority concerns were elsewhere and had more to do with reviving the economy which was in decline. But her economic policies of increasing state control over the commanding heights of the economy while providing relief to the majority was of little help to the Tamils as the industrial enterprises were located mainly in the South and the preference for Sinhala language proficiency in the public sector did not enable the Tamils to reap any benefit from this policy.

The other strand of her policy of exercising more state control over education through the virtual take-over of the assisted schools also indirectly created resentment among the Tamil middle classes and the Tamil Christians. Education in the Jaffna peninsula – the heartland of the Tamils – was largely in the hands of missionary schools. Sirimavo although educated throughout her school career in mission schools – Ferguson College in Ratnapura in the primary classes and then St Bridget’s Convent, Colombo, a leading Roman Catholic institution, was to pursue a determined policy of bringing the assisted schools under state control and eliminating the difference which existed between the privileged and the well-endowed mission schools and the state-run schools.

Some of the leading schools which had opted to remain outside of the state system and be fee levying private institutions, continued but with the changes introduced by Sirimavo a large number of important schools, including her own St Bridget’s lost the grant-in-aid from the state which had enabled them to run without charging fees. These in future were to be under the direct control of the state as regards recruitment of staff and the content of the education they imparted.

Her education policy, which was seen as part of the socialist orientation of the government was much resented by powerful elites, especially in the city of Colombo and among the higher bureaucracy, which had largely been recruited from the leading public schools. It was to trigger one of the principal challenges Sirimavo had to face, the attempted coup d’etat in January 1962.

The state take-over of assisted schools meant that state patronage and financial assistance, extended from colonial times to schools run by religious denominations, would cease. This followed earlier moves to curtail the visas of the nursing nuns of the Catholic orders who had for many years been the mainstay of the country’s health institutions, particularly in the cities.

The prime mintilster’s permanent secretary in the ministry of defence and external affairs NQ (Neil Quintus) Dias was well-known for his strong stand against ‘Catholic Action’ as it was then called. His actions in regard to the defence establishment and police were also being watched by the upper echelons of the three forces which were then largely manned by non-Buddhist officers who had had their secondary education mainly, in the denominational schools.

As these actions of the government continued, and there rose an influential lobby against the schools’ take-over, an important religious dignitary, Ignatius Cardinal Gracias, came over from Bombay, in a hurried visit to talk to the prime minister. Although he was courteously received and given high hospitality, Sirimavo did not retract from the stand she had taken. The Cardinal returned to Bombay mission unaccomplished.

The seeming lack of interest by the administration to the problems of the Tamils, as articulated by the FP and put forward in the Minimum Demands, led to the FP calling for a non-violent hartal at its party convention in Jaffna in January 1962. On February 20, 1962, Chelvanayakam led the satyagraha by lying down on the floor in front of the entrance to the Jaffna kachcheri and blocking entry to it. This soon became a mass movement of defiance to government authority and when on April 14 a postal service was inaugurated by the Federal Party, the government moved to declare a state of emergency.

The armed forces were sent in, the satyagrahis were dispersed and the Federal Party members were arrested. The satyagraha had collapsed but its echoes and the images of a Sinhalese army in occupation of the ‘Tamil homeland’ began to reverberate and form the genesis of the militant movement which was to emerge later. Brigadier Richard Udugama, later to be Army Commander, was an important figure in the restoration of law and order in the North.

The January 1962 Abortive Coup d’etat

This was the troublesome background in which the coup d’etat by military and police high-ups was planned to take place on the night of January 27, 1962, a Saturday. I believe this date was chosen since the prime minister was scheduled to be at Kataragama for a pirith ceremony that evening.

According to the program prepared by her aide D P Amerasinghe, Sirimavo was to leave Colombo on Friday, attend the puja on Saturday night and return to Colombo on Sunday. This decision was made 10 days before the date of the planned coup. However, on seeing the program for Kataragama, I recalled that about a month earlier the prime minister had received a letter from the Chief Incumbent of the Getambe Temple (Peradeniya) inviting her to a ceremony there on the same night. Sirimavo had asked me to write to the priest saying that she was unable to accept the invitation as some urgent work compelled her to remain in Colombo that evening.

As soon as I realized that the dates were clashing I quickly pointed out to the prime minister that it would not be proper for her to go to Kataragama on the night of January 27 particularly since she had informed the Getambe Temple priest that she was forced to remain in Colombo for some urgent duty. I told her that when the priest read in the newspapers that she was at Kataragama on the 27th night it would create a bad impression in his mind about her credibility. Mrs Bandaranaik appreciated my point and asked Amerasinghe to cancel the Kataragama trip. The coup leaders had planned their strategy assuming that Sirimavo would be at Kataragama that night. If Sirimavo had, in fact gone to Kataragama the coup may well have succeeded.

Planning for the take-over of the government had gone on for quite some time by a very few at the top. Security precautions based on the principle of those who ‘need to know’ had been strictly observed. The detailed plans were revealed to most of those involved only less than 48 hours from ‘H’ hour.

Colonel Maurice de Mel and Colonel F C de Saram were in charge of army arrangements for the coup, while Sydney de Zoysa and C C Dissanayake were in charge of police arrangements. Royce de Mel former Captain of the Navy, was also associated in the detailed planning of the coup, and it seems that the co-ordination and army and police operations was undertaken by Sydney de Zoysa, a retired DIG of police.

F C (Derrick) de Saram, was a key figure and wanted to ‘take the rap’ as he put it for the attempted coup. On hearing that something was seriously amiss that Sunday morning I reported to Sirimavo and Felix who were already at work at Temple Trees. F C de Saram, smartly turned out in his Colonel’s uniform – he was in the volunteer corps – and as usual, cheerful and confident, was at the front porch around 9.00 am. On my inquiring what was up since I was quite unaware of the night’s happenings, grinning broadly he replied breezily that there was some small matter which had come up on which he was wanted and went upstairs to where Felix had set up an investigating unit. I did not see him again until he was released from prison four years later.

Derrick was connected to the Bandaranaike family through marriage to an Obeysekere. He was a highly talented and popular figure with many sides to his character. I knew him well and admired him for his sportsmanship and his outstanding leadership for the Sinhalese Sports Club and his captaincy of All Ceylon at cricket. I did not realize that he had political sensitivities of any kind, until one evening after ‘nets’ at the SSC, he engaged me in a long conversation about his Oxford days and the part he had played in the agitation for Indian independence in the Indian Majlis — a vibrant agitational group at the time, in England. The conversation turned soon to the Sirimavo government’s socialist programs and the disastrous effect it was having on the country. I felt he was trying to draw me out and therefore, was cautious in my response.

As more and more military officers, many of them my acquaintances of the sports field, came in, the magnitude and widespread nature of the attempted coup came into focus. All of the Ministers of the Government, the Permanent Secretary for Defence and External Affairs, the Inspector-General of Police, the Deputy Inspector-General in charge of the Criminal Investigation Department, and some leftist leaders were among the persons to be arrested at some time after midnight on the 27th. The acting Captain of the Navy, Rajan Kadirgamar was also marked for arrest, while the other service commanders were to be restrained, and prevented from leaving their houses that night after a certain hour.

The persons arrested in Colombo were to be taken to army headquarters and imprisoned in the Ammunition Magazine, which is a reinforced concrete structure, partially underground. Those arrested outside Colombo were to be taken to the police headquarters of the area pending further instructions.

Soon after midnight, police cars equipped with radio and loud hailers were to be sent out to announce an immediate curfew in the city of Colombo.

As more and more details were revealed with the younger officers making long confessions” hoping that this would earn them a pardon, Felix tightened security and threw a cordon around Temple Trees. That evening I saw Rajan Kadirgamar dressed in blue battledress, toting a sub-machine gun and prowling up and down the front corridor. As he put it he was out there because no one knew, as of then, who was in and who was not and whether the coup was still on.

The atmosphere was very, very tense. Felix was in his element getting all the facts of the case and breaking down the evidence of those who tried to downplay what the plotters were doing on the Saturday night. They, the plotters were trying to make out that all they intended to do was a full dress rehearsal, to deal with an imminent breakdown of law and order that, they, the military top brass wished to avert in the national interest.

A feature of the investigation was the work of the DIG, CID, S A Dissanayake, the brother of C C Dissanayake, one of the chief suspects. The brothers had joined the force together as assistant superintendents, had been excellent policemen throughout and were competitive rivals. Blood was certainly not going to stand in the way of duty and Jingle (S A) was assiduous in unearthing fresh evidence against Jungle (C C) his own brother. This duty consciousness, in which duty transcended blood relationship, was perhaps part of a colonial inheritance, which is unheard of today.

Based on the facts revealed during the investigations, which were being conveyed to her each day, the prime minister was quick to act. Speedy changes were made in certain key positions in the armed forces and police. The attorney-general was consulted regarding the possibility of new laws to prosecute the plotters since existing legislation and procedures might be insufficient to deal with the case, and since there had been several references in the statements to the possible involvement of the Governor-General Oliver Goonetilleke, action to neutralize and remove him from office had to be effected as soon as possible.

Finally, the Cabinet decided to formulate new legislation to proceed with the case against 29 suspects. But this itself contained the seeds of failure. After conviction by the courts in Ceylon, the Privy Council to which the case was appealed proceeded to rule in favour of the accused now in remand on the grounds that the legislation was ultra vires to the Constitution. The defence had successfully pleaded the ground of the retroactive nature of the law and the Privy Council, the final court of appeal at the time had held with the appellants. The Privy Council judgment was delivered after the UNP had come back in 1965 and the government was not inclined to go any further. Whereupon those who had now spent around four years in detention and remand prison returned home and continued albeit at a lower profile to pursue their normal avocations both on the sports fields and in civil society.

As for the other line of action against the governor-general, this required two sets of measures. Firstly, informing the Queen since the governor-general was her appointee although the prime minister made the recommendation in the first instance. Secondly, to find a suitable alternative in case the Queen was prepared to drop Sir Oliver. There was fortunately for Sirimavo an appropriate candidate in William Gopallawa, then Ambassador in Washington. In Bandaranaike’s time Gopallawa who had been municipal commissioner of Kandy had been brought to Colombo as commissioner. Later he had been appointed Ambassador to China and thereafter in Sirimavo’s time Ambassador to Washington.

There had been some comment in the gossip columns of the weeklies that these appointments smacked of a little family bandyism since Gopallawa was the father-in-law of Mackie, Sirimavo’s brother. However, Bandaranaike had shrugged this off as Gopallawa had proved himself an efficient and clean municipal commissioner and a cautious and loyal ambassador and although not holding a particularly distinguished public service record, was fully eligible for the highest position in the political hierarchy.

On February 18, 1962 Felix Dias Bandaranaike made a statement in the House of Representatives and said that during the investigations of the attempted coup, the name of Sir Oliver Goonetilleke too had been mentioned. Sir Oliver indicated that he had no objection to being questioned like any other citizen. However, nobody had the power to question the duly appointed representative of the Queen without obtaining her permission.

I was sent on a secret mission to London – to see the Queen

One morning when I went to office, Sirimavo asked me to fly to London immediately with a ‘dangerous’ letter. I packed a suitcase and left for London in a hurry.Suffice it to say that when I returned to Ceylon after a week’s stay in London my mission had proved a success.

On the afternoon of February 26, 1962, we informed all newspaper offices and Radio Ceylon to stand by for a very important announcement to be released at midnight. Accordingly, Radio Ceylon too extended night transmissions beyond the normal closing times.

The announcement made under the name of Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike was broadcast at 12 midnight. It said that Her Majesty, the Queen of England, had kindly consented to a proposal made by the Queen’s Government in Ceylon to appoint Mr William Gopallawa as the governor-general of Ceylon to succeed Sir Oliver Goonetilleke. The appointment was to be effective from March 20, 1962, the announcement added. At the same time a similar announcement was made by Buckingham Palace, in London.