It appears that “optics” is what counts in this endeavour rather than achieving real unity

Local authority elections are looming large on the Sri Lankan political horizon. The anticipated island-wide “mini-election” has resulted in much activity among Sri Lanka’s political parties, groups and organisations. The Tamil dominated Northern Province and Tamil majority Eastern Province are also caught up in this election excitement.

There have been diverse attempts by concerned Tamil political parties to strike up new alliances or engage in strategic re-alignment in preparation for the polls. The primary objective of course is to perform well at the local authority polls. Furthermore the anticipated local elections have an important dimension this time as opposed to earlier times.

In the past, elections in the Tamil speaking regions was a “Tamilised” exercise. The competition was on two levels. The Tamil nationalist parties competed against each other on one level. On another level there was a clash between Tamil parties adopting a confrontational approach towards the governments of the day and Tamil parties adopting a cooperative approach or being aligned with the governments in power.

This political environment underwent a drastic change at the 2024 Parliamentary elections. For the first time in Sri Lanka’s post-independence history, a Sinhala dominated “national” party performed exceptionally well in the Northern and Eastern provinces.

The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) led National People’s power (NPP) obtained five out of twelve MP seats in the Northern Province. The JVP-NPP got seven out of sixteen seats in the Eastern Province. Of these MPs, seven were Tamils and five Sinhalese. The JVP-NPP Tamil MP breakdown was Jaffna – 3, Wanni – 2, Trincomalee – 1 and Batticaloa – 1. The Sinhala MP breakdown was four in Amparai and one in Trincomalee.

The Tamil parties in contrast fared poorly except for the Ilankai Thamil Arasuk Katchi (ITAK) known in English as the Federal Party (FP). The ITAK/FP won two seats in the north and five in the east. The JVP/NPP on the other hand got five Tamil MPs in the north and two in the east. The jewel in the JVP-NPP crown of victory was its remarkable success in Jaffna the stronghold of Tamil nationalism. The JVP-NPP got three of the six seats in Jaffna.

“Anura Alai” (Anura wave)

The commendable success of the JVP-led NPP in the north was due its campaign being spearheaded by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake known popularly as AKD. The “Anura Alai” (Anura wave) engulfed Tamil areas in what was a historic achievement. It was indeed a setback for the Tamil nationalist political parties. Even the ITAK’s creditable show was due to the Eastern Province where the party got five seats. In the north it got only two seats.

While acknowledging the political damage done by the Anura wave, many Tamil nationalist commentators and analysts attributed the Tamil political debacle to disunity in Tamil ranks. They pointed out that Tamil nationalist votes had been fragmented among several political parties and independent groups. If these votes had been cast for one or two Tamil nationalist parties alone, the AKD-led JVP-NPP could not have obtained so many seats in the north especially Jaffna. At best the JVP-NPP could have got a single seat in Jaffna. There is some merit in this line of thought.

The reasoning that the lack of unity among Tamil nationalist parties and groups has contributed to the JVP/NPP success in the north in general and Jaffna in particular has struck a responsive chord among most Tamil people. This has not gone unnoticed in Tamil political circles. Hence there is visible effort to forge unity or a unified approach towards the forthcoming local authority polls. By doing so the Tamil nationalist parties hope to roll back the Anura wave and regain political prestige by doing well at local elections. Unity is the key to victory is the core belief.

This drive to achieve unity or a unified approach at the local polls is fuelled by another factor also. The local authority election system based on the 60% ward cum 40% proportional representation ratio has resulted in a situation where very few parties have been able to get a clear majority in the local councils. This was the case in most of the Tamil majority local authority councils in the north and east after the 2018 elections also. Thus there is a need to embrace unity or adopt a unified approach in contesting local authority polls and forming viable administrations.

This has led to a situation where leaders and stalwarts of several Tamil political parties and groups are engaging in talks and discussions with the ostensible purpose of achieving Tamil political unity for the local polls. It appears that “optics” is what counts in this endeavour rather than achieving real unity. The idea seems to be that of demonstrating to the Tamil people that they tried and failed to forge unity and blaming the “other” parties for disunity. But more about this later.

The important question that arises at this juncture is why are the Tamil nationalist political parties not uniting? Why are they unable to forge unity or at least adopt a unified approach? Answering this question is quite difficult at present because the unity moves have not ended yet. There seems very little chances of unity but pronouncing a final verdict seems somewhat premature now.

Tamil National Alliance (TNA)

However an excursion into the past may provide an insight into the reasons for Tamil disunity. An important case in this regard is the formation and subsequent dissolution of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA). Most of the leading Tamil nationalist political parties such as the Ilankai Thamil Arasuk Katchi (ITAK) Ahila Ilankai Tamil Congress (AITC), Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) and People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) have all been constituents at one time or the other of the now defunct TNA.

The TNA that came into existence in 2001 held sway in Tamil politics for more than two decades winning the bulk of seats in Tamil majority regions. The TNA mocked as “Tiger dominated agents” by Douglas Devananda played a subservient role to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) during the war years of 2001 to 2009. The TNA became the dominant political entity in the north and to a lesser extent in the east in the post-war years of 2010 to 2024.

The TNA broke up “officially” at the time of the 2024 Parliamentary election. The ITAK and Tamil Congress contested separately and obtained eight and one seat each. The TELO, PLOTE and EPRLF with two other parties contested under the democratic Tamil National Alliance (DTNA) label and got one seat. Talks are now being held and letters exchanged among leaders of these three entities about evolving a common position on issues affecting the Tamil people and on dealing with the AKD-led Government.

The prospects for success in these unity efforts seem rather dismal. A case in point is the recent Budget. When the vote was taken, the sole Tamil Congress MP and party leader Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam voted against the Budget. The sole DTNA parliamentarian cum TELO Leader Selvam Adaikkalanathan voted for the Budget. The eight ITAK Parliamentarians were not present at voting time. Thus the three main Tamil nationalist parties in parliament – all of them ex-constituents of the defunct TNA – voted for and against the Budget or abstained from voting.

The different positions of these parties towards the Budget in Parliament is aptly illustrative of the lack of cohesion or inability to reach a common stance among former constituents of the Tamil National Alliance. It is also indicative of existing fault lines among Tamil nationalist parties causing divisions and promoting disunity. A brief re-run of history with emphasis on the rise and fall of the TNA is essential to understand the reasons for Tamil nationalist party disunity. It is against this backdrop that this column focuses on the formation and dissolution of the TNA with the aid of earlier writings.

10 October 2000 election

The origins of the Tamil National Alliance lie in the 10 October 2000 Parliamentary election. The results in the North-East sent shock waves to the Tamils in general and some Tamil parties in particular. The ITAK was then the premier constituent of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) which contested under the sun symbol.

No Tamil was elected in the politically sensitive Trincomalee district. In Batticaloa only two Tamils from the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) were elected. Another Tamil won from the ruling People’s Alliance (PA). In Amparai district a Tamil Independent backed by the EPDP was elected.

The Wanni district with six seats saw two Sinhala (from PA and UNP) and one Muslim MP being elected. Two Tamil MPs from the TELO and one from the PLOTE were also elected.

Jaffna then had nine seats. The EPDP got four including the bonus seat. The TULF got three. The Tamil Congress got one. The United National Party got one. No Tamil nationalist party got enough votes entitling it to a national list seat.

2000 saw the Tamils being under-represented in the North-East. Moreover Sinhala dominated national parties and Tamil parties like the Government affiliated EPDP had done well. The chief reasons for the non-governmental Tamil political party debacle was disunity, fragmentation of Tamil votes and the lack of an imaginative or inspiring political agenda.

Eastern University seminar

The seriousness of the situation was acutely felt in the ethnically heterogeneous East than the near homogenous North. A seminar analysing the situation was held at the Eastern University. It was chaired by former “Daily Mirror” columnist Dharmalingam Sivaram alias Taraki. Several academics, journalists, teachers, professionals, social workers, undergraduates and political representatives participated.

It was resolved at this conference that the different Tamil political parties in the opposition should unite under an umbrella organisation to prevent fragmentation of votes. It was also felt that such an organisation should be broadly supportive of the LTTE. It was also decided that the LTTE’s approval for the move be obtained. A steering committee with three joint chairs was formed to coordinate the implementation of this task.

Three aspects

This task consisted of three aspects. Firstly the approval and implicit support of the LTTE. This required guarantees of safety and security by the LTTE that it would not assassinate Tamil politicians in the opposition. In return these Tamil parties had to acknowledge the pre-eminence of the LTTE and endorse it as the sole representative of the Tamils in any negotiations.

Secondly the political parties with a militant history like the EPRLF, PLOTE and TELO had to declare that they would lay down arms and not collaborate with the State in hunting the LTTE. They also had to sever links with para-military outfits connected to them like the Razeek group (EPRLF) Mohan group (PLOTE) and Ranjan group (TELO). All were functioning in the East.

Thirdly the non-militant parties like the TULF and Tamil Congress had to agree to work together in a common front with the ex-militant groups. Both parties were reluctant as they felt the hands of the ex-militant groups were tainted with blood. Besides the TULF stood for an “unarmed democracy”.

There was also the long, bitter history of rivalry between the Tamil Congress and the ITAK-TULF.

The TULF was also wary because of its 1989 experience. Pressure by New Delhi had resulted in militant organisations like the Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF), TELO and EPRLF contesting under the aegis of the TULF sun symbol along with original TULF candidates then. However none of the original TULF candidates won. Only Appapillai Amirthalingam got in through the national list (he had lost in Batticaloa).

The LTTE in the Wanni was not directly involved in the negotiating process. But Karikalan the former Tiger political commissar for Batticaloa-Amparai was supportive and directly involved. Even as the talks were on the LTTE assassinated “Robert” the TELO head of Aaraiyampathy Pradeshiya Sabha (this Robert is different to the EPRLF “Robert” killed by the LTTE in Jaffna in 2002). The assassination was a major setback as the TELO wanted to pull out of unity talks as a result.

The committee however persisted in its efforts and appealed to the LTTE’s military leadership of the East. The eastern regional military commander then was none other than Vinayagamoorthy Muraleetharan alias “Col” Karuna. The LTTE “explained” that the assassination was a “mistake” due to a communication gap between the intelligence division and political wing.

Subsequently leading personalities from the TELO and EPRLF met with Karikalan in secret and discussed matters. Assurances were obtained. Likewise some TULF personalities also met with LTTE leaders and had discussions.

Two problems

Initially there were two problems. The PLOTE led by Dharmalingam Siddharthan was willing for unity but the PLOTE cadres in Vavuniya (PLOTE stronghold) were unwilling to align with the TELO (also strong in Vavuniya) Likewise the TELO hierarchy was also reluctant to unite with the PLOTE as it feared erosion of support in the Wanni. Finally the PLOTE or its political party the Democratic People’s Liberation Front (DPLF) opted out.

The second was the long standing antipathy of the Tamil Congress towards the Federal Party/Ilankai Thamil Arasu Katchi and its successor the TULF. The Tamil Congress wanted all parties to unite under the Tamil Congress symbol of cycle and contest instead of the TULF’s sun.

Dr. Yogalakshmi Ponnambalam was then the dominant personality in the Tamil Congress as her husband and Tamil Congress leader Kumar Ponnambalam had been killed on 5 January 2000.After protracted discussions held at her residence she consented to unite and contest under the sun symbol. Similarly some stalwarts in the TULF were also reluctant to unite with the Congress and other ex-militant groups but gradually they were won over or reduced to silence.

Even as these discussions continued two parallel courses of action were also underway. One was the sudden appearance of leaflets and statements to the press by hitherto unheard of organisations like Sankiliyan padai, Kulakkottan padai and Pandara Vanniyan padai. While “padai” means force the other references were to regional rulers like King Sankili of Jaffna, Kulallottan monarch of Trincomalee and chieftain Pandaravanniyan of Adankapatru. All these leaflets and statements urged Tamil unity and threatened those not cooperating with punitive action. They were given wide publicity in Tamil newspapers.

The other parallel course of action was the well-meaning efforts of some Colombo based prominent Tamils to bring about overall Tamil unity. These Tamils comprised leading businessmen, professionals and social workers. Some of them were involved in discussions with counterparts in Batticaloa striving for unity. The efforts of these “Colombo” based Tamils also played a major role in unity talks.

At the penultimate stages the LTTE in the Wanni got directly involved. Some leaders of the TULF, Tamil Congress, TELO and EPRLF were contacted by telephone and urged to unite and contest under the TULF “Sun” symbol. The LTTE factor galvanised the negotiating parties into concluding talks successfully.

22 October 2001 communique

A working agreement among the TULF, ACTC, EPRLF and TELO was reached to form a coalition known as the “Thamizh Thesieeya Kootamaippu” or Tamil National Alliance. The TNA would contest under the TULF symbol of sun. A scheme apportioning candidates to each party in the different electoral districts was also agreed upon. The formation of the Tamil National Alliance was announced through a press communiqué dated 22 October 2001.

The press communique issued on 22 October 2001 heralding the formation of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) was signed by four persons representing the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), and Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF).

They were R. Sampanthan (TULF), N. Kumarakuruparan (ACTC), N. Srikantha (TELO), and K. Premachandran (EPRLF). The press statement had four salient points that more or less amounted to an “articles of association” for the Tamil National Alliance.

The first was about how places on candidate lists were to be allocated to each of the four parties in a Parliamentary General election. The arrangement was as follows:

• Trincomalee – TULF – 3; ACTC – 1; TELO – 2; EPRLF – 0
• Wanni – TULF – 3; ACTC – 1; TELO – 4; EPRLF – 1
• Jaffna – TULF – 7; ACTC – 3; TELO – 1; EPRLF – 1
• Batticaloa – TULF – 5; ACTC – 1; TELO – 2; EPRLF – 1
• Amparai – TULF – 5; ACTC – 1; TELO-1; EPRLF – 0

The second point was about nominations as national list MPs. The order of priority was TULF, ACTC, TELO and EPRLF. If the TNA was entitled to a national list MP in terms of votes received it would first go to the TULF nominee. If entitled to a second MP it would be for the ACTC nominee.

The third point was that the constituent parties should refrain from attacking or criticising each other publicly. Special care should be taken during the election campaign about not engaging in propaganda or counter-propaganda against a fellow TNA constituent.

The fourth point was about intra-TNA disputes and problems. If and when such issues occurred the TNA constituents should discuss the matter among themselves in a peaceful way and arrive at an amicable solution through a majority vote. If that was not possible the services of an outside facilitator panel should be enlisted to help resolve the issue.

The facilitator panel or “Anusaranaialar Kuzhu” comprised the following six members:

V. Kailasapillai

Kanthiah Neelakandan

V.R. Vadivetkarasan

Nimalan Karthikeyan

S. Thiyagarajah

K. Jeyabalasingham

The facilitators were respected members of the Tamil community primarily based in Colombo. They were mainly professionals or successful commercial entrepreneurs. With the exception of Thiyagarajah who was then the treasurer of the TULF they did not belong to any political party.

5 December 2001 election

It is under such circumstances that the TNA was born as a loose formation without a party constitution or structure. The newly formed alliance had its baptism of fire when Parliamentary elections was held on 5 December 2001. The TNA in its manifesto urged a negotiated settlement of the ethnic conflict and emphasised that the LTTE would represent the Tamil people at such talks. What happened thereafter would be related in detail in the second part of this article.