Small State Diplomacy:

There is a vast and increasingly interesting body of literature on the ways in which small and militarily and economically not so powerful countries, such as Sri Lanka, could deal with more powerful countries such as India and China, the United States and Canada and much of Western Europe, with whom Sri Lanka has trade and political links. In general, small state diplomacy is understood in the context of and in opposition to great power diplomacy. Until the Cold War came to an end, small states were generally seen as ‘rule-takers’ or those following diktats set by powerful nations, the ‘rule-makers’. Along the same vein, such small nations were also seen as mere consumers of security products and military alliances rather than initiators of these things.

But in contemporary times, there are many studies that have attempted to explain how and under what conditions it would be possible for the foreign policies of small states and their diplomatic efforts to influence and impact international affairs. Ideally, like more powerful countries, the goals of smaller and less powerful nations should also reflect their own core national interests, including safeguarding territorial integrity, advancing prosperity, and protecting the rights of their citizens beyond their borders. But these interests should be advanced in tandem with broader global concerns, focused on influencing the international environment in general.

It is in this context that Sri Lanka has spectacularly failed as a small state, particularly after the collapse of the Non-Aligned Movement and the abysmal failure of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. Sri Lanka’s failure has also resulted from very specific local ruptures directly linked to dismantling democratic practices in the country since the late 1970s. These include the steady politicization and the resultant mediocratization of the country’s Foreign Service and the negative impact of the long lineage of elected but unenlightened political leaders from Presidents to Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers and others who have undisputedly compromised Sri Lankan foreign policy and global standing. The country has not produced diplomats in a long time who have steadfastly looked after Sri Lanka’s interests in the world without pandering to the diktats of autocratic governments at home, with the assurance that they will be protected in return.

Similarly, Sri Lanka has been very unfortunate to not have leaders at the apex of local power who could intelligently and sensibly speak their mind to global and regional powers with a clear understanding of how international politics work and how the country can protect its national interest within this rubric.

So far, there has been an utter compromise of such interests through personal greed, the lack of preparedness and absence of intelligence. This is the reason Sri Lankan diplomacy and foreign policy have often failed or become very ordinary, even when it comes to crucial elements of the field, such as negotiations. I include in this category both political leaders and weak-willed and unenlightened foreign service officers. This has resulted in Sri Lanka ending up agreeing to be part of woefully inadequate and nationally unprofitable agreements, thereby constantly relegated to being on the proverbial backfoot; the longstanding Human Rights Council resolution in Geneva being a case in point, while the Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement is another problematic example from the region. As a nation, we have shown our incapability in negotiating not only with more powerful countries, but even with private entities from such countries.

Against this backdrop, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s state visit to India, in December 2024, can be seen as a breath of fresh air on how one may engage in a more refined foreign policy that will look after local interests at the global level. Given our usual pusillanimity, the stand taken by President Disanayake when India’s Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar called on him, becomes interesting. Of course, Jaishankar is a seasoned career diplomat who has always stood for India’s interests internationally, while Dissanayake is a man without experience in dealing with global leaders. After all, this was his first state visit with a motley crew, equally lacking experience in international relations.

However, by all reports reaching us from the discourse on this visit, Dissanayake did well even though much of this has not been adequately reported in the press, barring the solitary intervention by Minister Sunil Handunnetti in Parliament, in February 2025. President Dissanayake’s success came from his political acumen and extreme confidence emanating from the powerful local mandate he had been given by the Sri Lankan people. He expressed what he had to say without floundering, in clear Sinhala, which was translated into English. At one point, Jaishankar had engaged Dissanayake on the perennial fishermen’s issue involving the two countries. He said it would be good to find a solution that made sense to Sri Lanka, but it also needed to convince the political interests in Tamil Nadu.

In his response, President Dissanayake minced no words, articulating where his responsibility lies, stating that for the first time people from northern Sri Lanka showed confidence in a political party from the south, which he represented, and it was essential to build on this trust and safeguard their rights, livelihood and security. In other words, he resisted the usual official Indian refrain and raised without reservations the issue of Indian poaching in Sri Lankan waters. Sri Lanka’s firm position on this controversial issue was thus elucidated very clearly by President Dissanayake to Dr Jaishankar.

For me, used to seeing nationally counter-productive positions and agreements shoved down Sri Lanka’s throat by powerful nations and organizatipns at international meetings, this was a refreshing textbook example of how a small country should conduct its foreign relations with a powerful neighbour with a reasonable degree of self-respect and core national interest at heart. But this is merely one example of Dissanayake’s numerous successful engagements with Jaishankar. It is understood that other such instances include Dissanayake’s stand on India’s interest in constructing a land bridge between the two countries and its persistent pressure on the 13th Amendment to Sri Lanka’s Constitution.

This brings to my mind a comparatively different example from the Yahapalanaya era. In 2015, while preparing to meet the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala with a small group of academics and friends, I was informed by one of his staff members that he longed to visit the Temple of the Tooth in Kandy, at least once in his life, the only significant Buddhist temple connected directly to the life of the Buddha he had not been able visit. The reason being he would not be given a visa by the Sri Lankan government due to its needless deference to the Chinese government. This had become an unquestioned and established practice of Sri Lankan foreign policy with regard to the Dalai Lama. The irony is that this is a highly respected global personality who continues to be welcomed openly by countries which have robust trade and political relations with China. I took it upon myself to write to President Maithirpala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe that Sri Lanka should allow the Dalai Lama to visit and expounded on why this would not dent our relations with China. I never heard from them. I was also told by Sri Lankan diplomats at the time both in Delhi and Colombo this would never happen.

This is a telling example of the mediocrity and non-independence of our foreign policy, even at a fundamental level. It is, and not only in this instance, often dictated by what other nations might think, or how they may feel or react, rather than what Sri Lanka wants to do in keeping with its convictions, and that, too, without properly evaluating the merits of each case. Consecutive post-Independence Sri Lankan governments have not issued a visa to the Dalai Lama. Juxtapose this to the instance when in 2014, the Mahinda Rajapaksa government allowed the violent Burmese Buddhist monk, Ashin Wirathu, who once identified himself as ‘the Burmese bin Laden’ to visit Sri Lanka to attend a public meeting in Colombo.

This needs to be considered in terms of realpolitik. That is, would the Chinese want to lose out on the far greater advantages of their considerable investments and structures of influence by withdrawing from Sri Lanka, because the Sri Lankan government allowed the elderly Dalai Lama a deeply personal spiritual visit? At most, they would issue an irate statement conveying their displeasure as they have done consistently on all such occasions involving other countries. But on the Sri Lankan government’s part, depriving a visit to the Dalai Lama to the Temple of the Tooth located in the UNESCO World Heritage Site of Kandy no less, is utterly un-Buddhist for a state that accords the foremost place to Buddhism in its constitution. I do hope President Dissanayake would be able to see the frivolity of the reasoning of his successors and advance the possibilities in his newfound textbook on small state diplomacy.

But, in the long term, this new textbook approach will be successful only if more concrete work is put into the process. A visit by the Dalai Lama would be one aspect that can send a much needed signal to the world that finally our foreign policy is standing on its own feet without compromising the country’s relations with other nations. More can be done when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visits Sri Lanka on 5th April 2025. One hopes that Dissanayake will engage with his foreign visitor to make clear what the national interests are.

After all, the land bridge idea consistently pushed by India is vehemently opposed by both the country’ powerful Buddhist clergy and many ordinary Sri Lankans who happen to have brought President Dissanayake and his party to power. The 13th Amendment, forced into the Sri Lankan Constitution with direct Indian intervention, albeit under an Indian National Congress (INC) government, should never be part of any future constitution. After all, President Dissanayake’s own party, the JVP, has consistently opposed the 13th Amendment. This does not mean, however, that regional socio-political interests within the island should not be addressed in a future constitution-making process within a local paradigm; they certainly should be.

On the other hand, while we should be open to Indian investments and any others in keeping with the laws of the land, allowing backdoor and illegal entry of projects of the kind that Adani attempted, should be out of the question. This can be part of the conversation during the upcoming visit of Mr Modi. It would behoove the Sri Lankan government to be mindful that Indian foreign policy in the region has in recent times run into spectacular failures as exemplified by the cases of Bangladesh, Nepal and the Maldives as well as India’s general inability to counter Chinese influence in the region.

One hopes that President Dissanayake will continue to engage with his visitor and others like him in times to come in the manner he has already established during his 2024 state visit to India.